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BC’s Memorial 
On August 10, 2018 45-year-old Fredericton Police Constable Lawrence Robert (Robb) Costello 
and 43-year-old Fredericton Police Constable Sara Mae Helen Burns were killed by gunfire as 
they responded to a shooting at an apartment building. Two other Fredericton residents, 42-year-
old Donald Adam Robichaud and 32-year-old Bobbie Lee Wright, were also killed. A 48-year-old 
Fredericton man was charged with four counts of first degree murder in relation to this event. 
Constable Costello is survived by his spouse and four children. Constable Burns is survived by her 
spouse and three children. 
IN MEMORIAM
“They are our heroes. We shall not forget them.” 
inscription, Canadian Police And Peace Officer's Memorial
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Advanced Police Training
at the Justice Institute of BC
Looking to refresh or develop your current skills? 
Our Advanced Training Program provides in-
depth development opportunities for law 
enforcement officers. Some of our courses involve 
training in traditional and online investigations; 
patrol operations, as well as surveillance 
techniques and developing leadership skills. 
Sworn municipal officers, RCMP, peace officers, 
and other law enforcement officers (by approval) 
are encouraged to register. 
Upcoming Courses for Fall 2018
Basic Tactical Surveillance Training @ New 
West Campus: September 10 – 14
Basic Tactical Surveillance Training @ 
Victoria Campus: September 24 – 28
Standard Field Sobriety Training @ New 
West Campus: October 1 – 4 (B.C. officers only)
Intro to Tactical Surveillance (2-Day Footing) 
@ New West Campus: October 10 - 11 
Advanced Crisis Negotiator Training @ New 
West Campus: October 22 – 26
Advanced Police Training Contact Information
advancedpolicetraining@jibc.ca
604-528-5761
To view other 2018 courses, 
go to http://bit.ly/plceadv
**2019 Calendar will be published soon** 
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Beyond bullet points.
Cliff Atkinson.
New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2018.
HF 5718.22 A87 2018
The book of mistakes: 9 secrets to creating a 
successful future.
Skip Prichard.
New York : Center Street, 2018.
BF 637 S4 P7485 2018
The Canadian Press stylebook: a guide for writers 
and editors. 
James McCarten, editor.
Toronto: The Canadian Press, 2017.
PN 4783 C35 2017
CMA driver's guide: determining medical fitness 
to operate motor vehicles.
Ottawa: Joule, a CMA Company, 2017.
TL 152.35 D485 2017
Coaching and mentoring at work : developing 
effective practice.
 Mary Connor & Julia Pokora.
London: Open University Press/McGraw-Hill 
Education, 2017.
HF 5385 C66 2017
Counter-terrorism for emergency responders.
Robert A. Burke.
Boca  Raton: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 
2018.
HV 6431 B866 2018
Crisis leadership: how to lead in times of crisis, 
threat and uncertainty.
by Tim Johnson.
London; New York: Bloomsbury Business, 2018.
HD 49 J655 2018
Develop your leadership skills.
John Adair.
London; Philadelphia: Kogan Page, 2016.
HD 57.7 A2746 2016
The essentials of leadership in government: 
understanding the basics. 
Len Garis, Colette Squires, & Darryl Plecas.
Abbotsford: University of the Fraser Valley, 2018.
HD 57.7 G37 2018
Handbook of victims and victimology.
edited by Sandra Walklate.
London; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis 
Group, 2018.
HV 6250.25 H34 2018
High performance habits: how extraordinary 
people become that way. 
Brendon Burchard.
Carlsbad: Hay House, Inc., 2017.
BF 637 S4 B867 2017
Influence without authority.
Allan R. Cohen, David L. Bradford.
Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2017.
HD 58.9 C64 2017
Legal research: step by step.
Margaret Kerr, JoAnn Kurtz, Arlene Blatt.
Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publishing Ltd, 2018.
KE 250 K47 2018
Peace leadership: the quest for connectedness.
edited by Stan Amaladas & Sean Byrne.
London ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2018.
JZ 5538 P374 2018
Practical research: planning and design.
Paul Leedy & Jeanne Ormrod; with Laura Johnson.
New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2019.
Q 180.55 M4 L43 2018
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OFFENDER’s SENTENCE 
DOUBLED FOR STABBING 
POLICE OFFICER
R. v. Mala, 2018 NUCA 2

Police received a report at 10:00 pm 
that the 19-year old accused was 
outside a house waving a gun and 
threatening  to kill police officers. Two 
police officers attended the scene 
and observed a pellet gun lying on the ground. The 
accused was at the top of the stairs to the house 
yelling, “shoot me, shoot me.” An officer pointed a 
carbine at him and told him to lie  down. The 
accused continued to yell at the police  officers to 
shoot him and then ran into the house. When 
police entered the house, the officer encountered 
the accused in the kitchen. By that time, the 
accused had grabbed a knife and said, “I’m going 
to fucking kill you”, and stabbed the officer once in 
the left arm. The officer pushed back and attempted 
to fire his carbine, but it did not fire properly. The 
accused then stabbed the officer twice more in the 
arm. Another officer tasered the  accused and took 
control of him. The injured officer was taken to a 
health centre while  the accused, who was agitated, 
intoxicated and smelled strongly of alcohol, was 
arrested. At police cells, the accused was yelling 
that he would wipe out the cops.
Nunavat Court of Justice 
The accused pled guilty to aggravated 
assault and possessing a weapon for a 
dangerous purpose. The  accused sought 
a sentence of time served plus three 
years probation while the Crown sought a two-and-
a-half to three year sentence. The judge considered 
the accused’s background growing up, a recent 
brain injury he sustained, his family support and his 
current circumstances including:
• His age (19-years-old at the time of the 
offence);
• His lack of criminal record;
• He was not setting out to harm anyone other 
than himself;
• Hi s gu i l t y  p l ea and accep tance o f 
responsibility; and
• The incident was “suicide by cop” and the 
officer’s injuries were minor and transitory. 
The judge sentenced the accused to nine months in 
jail for the aggravated assault and three months in 
jail, to be served consecutively, for the  weapon 
offence. He was also given two years’ probation 
with the usual conditions and an additional 
counseling provision.
Nunavut Court of Appeal
Th e C r o w n a r g u e d t h e 
sentencing judge erred, in part, 
by imposing a sentence that 
was demonstrably unfit. In its 
view, the trial judge mischaracterized the incident 
as “suicide by cop” and treated the police officer’s 
injuries as minor and transitory. 
Justice Bielby, authoring the Appeal Court’s 
decision, agreed with the Crown that the sentence 
“An assault on a police officer is more serious and is to be treated more seriously than an 
assault on another type of victim as evidenced by Parliament’s creation of a separate 
offence of aggravated assault on a peace officer, section 270.02 of the Criminal Code of 
Canada.”
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imposed was demonstrably unfit. “It was 
unreasonable and a marked departure from other 
sentences imposed in similar circumstances,” said 
the Court of Appeal. “An assault on a  police officer 
is more serious and is to be treated more seriously 
than an assault on another type of victim as 
evidenced by Parliament’s creation of a separate 
offence of aggravated assault on a peace 
officer, section 270.02 of the Criminal Code of 
Canada.”
The Court of Appeal continued:
[S]ection 718.02 of theCriminal Coderequires 
that the primary consideration in sentencing for 
a breach ofsection 270.02must be deterrence 
and denunciation. Sentences imposed must 
reflect the police officer’s vulnerability, society’s 
dependence on the police, and the goal of 
avoiding the creation of a mentality towards the 
police that invites easy resort to violence. [para. 
20]
The particular circumstances of policing in the 
north were also considered as officers in small, 
isolated communities are particularly vulnerable. 
As well, the sentencing judge erred in concluding 
that “the evidence did not support the finding that 
the accused … set out to harm the police officers 
or anyone but himself.” She also did not 
adequately address the  serious nature of the police 
officer’s injuries and the risk  to the officer when he 
was stabbed.
As a result, the Court of Appeal substituted a 
sentence of 21 months on the aggravated assault 
offence and three months less a day consecutively 
on the weapon offence for a  total of two years less 
a day minus credit for pretrial custody. All other 
terms of the  original sentence, including his 
probation order, remained in effect.This sentence, 
although increased, was recognized as being on the 
lower end of the proper range of sentencing for the 
offence of aggravated assault on a police officer.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org

BY THE BOOK:
 s. 270 - 270.03 Criminal Code of Canada
Assaulting a peace officer
s. 270  (1) Every one commits an offence 
who
(a)  assaults a public officer or peace 
officer engaged in the execution of his 
duty or a person acting in aid of such an officer;
(b)  assaults a person with intent to resist or prevent 
the lawful arrest or detention of himself or another 
person; or
(c) assaults a person
(i) who is engaged in the lawful execution of a process 
against lands or goods or in making a lawful distress 
or seizure, or
(ii) with intent to rescue anything taken under lawful 
process, distress or seizure.
Punishment
(2)  Every one who commits an offence under 
subsection (1) is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
[...]
Aggravated assault of peace officer
s. 270.02  Everyone who, in committing an assault 
referred to in section 270, wounds, maims, disfigures 
or endangers the life of the complainant is guilty of an 
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a 
term of not more than 14 years.
Sentences to be served consecutively
s. 270.03  A sentence imposed on a person for an 
offence under subsection 270(1) or 270.01(1) or 
section 270.02 committed against a law enforcement 
officer, as defined in subsection 445.01(4), shall be 
served consecutively to any other punishment imposed 
on the person for an offence arising out of the same 
event or series of events.
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Canadian Police and
Peace Officers’ 41st
Annual Memorial Service
September 30, 2018
Parliament Hill
Ottawa, Ontario
Le 41e service commémoratif
annuel des policiers et des
agents de la paix canadiens
Le 30 septembre 2018
Colline du Parlement
Ottawa (Ontario)
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by Doug Semple, Inspector, Stakeholder Relations and 
Community Policing, Metro Vancouver Transit Police, and 
Ralph Kaisers, Vice President, B.C. Police Association; both 
are members of the BC First Responders Mental-Health 
Committee.
If the above images seem familiar, you may already 
know about the “Share  It. Don’t Wear It” awareness 
campaign aimed at first responders in British 
Columbia. These particular images and words were 
chosen to represent the  mental-health challenges 
law-enforcement officers and dispatchers face in 
their day-to-day work. 
What you may not know is who’s behind the 
campaign — which includes a website full of tools 
and resources for those who are looking for help 
and those who are looking to help — or how it 
came to be. This article will describe the process so 
that other jurisdictions who see a  need for 
something s imilar can benef i t f rom our 
experiences.
In December of 2015, the  multi-agency B.C. First 
Responders Mental Health Committee was formed. 
Chaired by WorkSafeBC, its mission was quickly 
defined: to actively promote positive mental health 
and provide the leadership and recommended 
practices that first responders, their communities, 
and their leaders need. 
In order to ensure a coordinated, cohesive 
approach, committee members were recruited from 
law enforcement, fire, ambulance services, and 
dispatch – representing workers and employers 
from paid, volunteer, rural, urban, and First Nations 
Emergency Services. Once formed, the committee 
identified its main goals, one of which was to 
develop and pilot an anti-stigma campaign 
incorporating champions from various first-
responder groups.
The “Share It. Don’t Wear It” campaign came out of 
a four-month research initiative, in which the 
committee surveyed first responders to better 
MENTAL-HEALTH COMMITTEE BRINGS TOGETHER FIRST 
RESPONDERS TO LEAD AN ANTI-STIGMA CAMPAIGN & 
PROVIDE ACCESS TO HELP
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understand their attitudes toward mental-health 
issues and the behaviours that encourage people to 
seek or offer help – or that deter them. Through in-
depth interviews and an online discussion board, 
participants identified existing resources and those 
they felt were lacking. First responders from diverse 
backgrounds and levels of experience completed 
the study.
Equipped with those results, the committee held 
intensive focus groups to explore the forms stigma 
takes: what it looks like from leaders and 
colleagues, and how it can be personal, social, or 
structural in nature. 
Posters, which can be downloaded from the site, 
were designed with a blank space at the bottom to 
highlight resources, meetings, events and 
workshops, so that the emphasis is on action. The 
aim is to associate the poster with a specific, time-
limited event, after which it is taken down, so the 
image doesn’t become background noise.
The quotes that appear over the faces of the  officer 
and the dispatcher pictured above were collected 
during in-depth interviews with our colleagues: “I 
just feel this giant weight and I carry it everywhere. 
I can’t unwind. Even when I take time off, I don’t 
feel relaxed. I’m on edge. Like every day, I’m on 
edge”; “I feel worn down, overwhelmed. 
Sometimes it’s hard to think clearly. I can’t 
remember when I noticed the change – it just sort 
of became normal, I guess.”
Respondents spoke powerfully about the need for a 
cultural change — a shift that must happen at the 
leadership level. They asked for a single source of 
information and resources to support colleagues 
and to seek information for themselves. A website 
was created for this purpose, but that is not its only 
purpose. We hope the site, which houses self-
assessment and self-care tools, an event calendar, 
and resources for those in crisis, will spark larger 
conversations about mental health.
As committee members, we invite you to send us 
your thoughts and suggestions on how we can best 
meet the mental-health needs of law-enforcement 
officers in B.C. 
Please note that the committee will be holding the 
first-ever BC First Responders’ Mental Health 
Conference on Jan. 31 and Feb. 1, 2019. For more 
d e t a i l s p l e a s e s e e t h e w e b s i t e a t 
www.bcfirstrespondersmentalhealth.com. 
Ralph Kaisers is the Vice President of 
the BC Police Association. Email him 
at rkaisers@vpu.ca.
Doug Semple is the Inspector of 
Stakeholder Relations and 
Community Policing for the Metro 
Vancouver Transit Police. Email him 
at Doug.Semple@transitpolice.bc.ca.
ONLINE INVESTIGATIONS 
COURSES OFFERED THROUGH 
JIBC ADVANCED TRAINING 
Real life investigations are rapidly evolving with 
the prevalence of social media and internet use. 
Become better prepared to investigate online 
crime or internet fraud with Online Investigations 
courses delivered in association with Cyber 
Training International and the JIBC. 
Start anytime from anywhere – 
these courses are completely online. 
Go to www.cybertraining.ca or 
email advancedpolicetraining@jibc.ca 
for more information.
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DETENTION ANCHORED IN 
SAFETY CONCERN NOT 
ARBITRARY
R. v. Rai, 2018 ONCA 623

The accused, a professional truck 
driver, was driving a commercial 
truck with a trailer attached along a 
highway. The box on the trailer could 
be raised and lowered using a Power 
Take-off (PTO) system. The accused had left the 
PTO lever in the “On” position and the box struck a 
bridge and a collision occurred. Three other 
motorists were injured and the bridge’s overhead 
structure was damaged and partially collapsing. 
Several police officers and other emergency 
personnel were dispatched to the chaotic scene. 
Police focused on moving non-essential people and 
vehicles away from the collision site. A police 
officer saw the accused sitting alone on the 
guardrail about 10 feet from hanging steel girders 
and he was also seen wandering around the crash 
site. At 4:24 pm, a police officer was directed to 
bring the accused “to a safe location for his safety.” 
The officer escorted the accused to his police 
cruiser and placed him in it. He was not 
handcuffed, the air conditioning was running and 
the windows were rolled down to let in a breeze. 
The accused was permitted to use his cell phone, 
which he did many times, including calls to his 
dispatcher.
While he was in the police car, the  accused asked 
the officer questions which the officer tried to 
answer. At 4:40 p.m. a detective arrived and spoke 
to the officer. The detective said he was not yet 
ready to interview the accused. At about 7:14 pm, 
the officer again left the cruiser to speak to the 
detective. When he returned to his police car, the 
officer detected a smell of alcohol on the accused’s 
breath. He was then taken to a nearby police 
station where  readings of 226mg% and 220mg% 
were obtained. The accused was arrested and 
charged with impaired driving, over 80mg%, 
dangerous driving and mischief endangering life.
Ontario Court of Justice
The Crown conceded that the taking of 
breath samples into an approved 
i n s t r u m e n t b r e a c h e d s . 8 o f 
the Charter because they were taken 
outside the three hour window as provided in the 
Criminal Code. The judge then excluded the breath 
test evidence.
The judge also found that the accused had been 
investigatively detained at 4:40 pm when the officer 
left the cruiser to speak to the detective. However, 
the judge found the detention was not arbitrary 
under s. 9 of theCharterduring the approximately 
2.5 hours he was confined to the  police cruiser. 
And, even if he was arbitrarily  detained, the judge 
would not have excluded the smell of the accused’s 
breath under s. 24(2) of theCharter.But the judge 
did conclude that the police should have informed 
the accused of his s. 10(a) Charter right to be 
informed promptly of the reason for the detention 
and his s. 10(b) right to retain and instruct counsel. 
However, applying s. 24(2), he again declined to 
exclude the evidence relating  to the alcohol breath 
odour.
The judge dismissed the impaired driving and over 
80mg% charges and acquitted the accused of 
mischief endangering life. However, he found the 
accused guilty of dangerous driving, evidence  of 
which included his consumption of alcohol. The 
accused was sentenced to one year in custody. 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The accused argued, among 
other things, that the trial judge 
erred in concluding that his 
2.5 hours confinement in the 
police cruiser was not an arbitrary detention. In his 
view, his ss. 9 and 10 Charter rights were violated 
and the odour of alcohol on his breath out to have 
been excluded as evidence. 
The Court of Appeal rejected the accused’s 
submission. “The principal, and continuing, 
purpose  of the [accused’s] detention was his own 
“The principal, and continuing, purpose of the [accused’s] detention was his own safety,”
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safety,” said the Appeal Court. “His truck had 
caused a terrible accident with extensive damage 
to vehicles and a bridge and injuries to several 
people. The police noticed the [accused] walking 
around a dangerous accident scene and sitting on 
a guardrail very close to a  damaged and collapsing 
girder. Importantly, his truck was crushed.” The 
Court continued:
Unlike other motorists who were confined to 
their vehicles for up to three hours while police 
and emergency personnel dealt with the 
carnage caused by the accident, the [accused] 
could not return to his destroyed truck. In these 
circumstances, it made perfect sense for the 
police to do what they did – place the 
[accused] in a police cruiser and try to make 
him comfortable. The [accused] was concerned 
about his truck and gave no indication of a 
desire to leave. He asked questions of [the 
officer] about the accident that caused [the 
officer] to leave the cruiser to obtain 
information that he conveyed to the [accused]. 
The [accused] also spoke several times to his 
dispatcher. He also had [the officer] speak to 
the dispatcher. ….
In summary, in the context of a complex and 
dangerous accident scene and the police 
treatment on site of the [accused] anchored in a 
concern for his safety, the detention of the 
[accused] was lawful; it was the antithesis of an 
‘arbitrary’ detention and, therefore, did not 
infringe s. 9 of theCharter. [para. 20-21]
As for not excluding the smell of alcohol on the 
accused’s breath based on the s. 10(a) and (b) 
breaches, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial 
judge’s s. 24(2) ruling. First, the trial judge found 
the police made an understandable mistake. Failing 
to inform the accused of his s. 10 rights was not 
severe nor was it deliberate. The officers acted in 
good faith. Second, the police would have smelled 
the odour of alcohol regardless of the accused’s 
detention. He would have remained at the scene 
with the many other motorists and eventually come 
into contact with police. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
conviction was upheld. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
GENERAL WARRANT OK EVEN IF 
CONVENTIONAL WARRANT 
COULD HAVE BEEN OBTAINED 
R. v. Jodoin, 2018 ONCA 638
The police had information from 
several sources that the accused was 
dealing cocaine. They corroborated 
this information with surveillance 
showing frequent vehicle stops of 
short duration. They also believed that the accused 
was using a vacant commercial premise as a  stash 
house. Although there was a sign on the premises, 
it did not appear to be an active business. There 
was no merchandise in the store and the telephone 
number for the business was not in service. The 
accused attended at the premises sporadically  for 
short periods of time, and used a key to get in. An 
informant told police that the accused’s partner in 
the drug business lived in a residential premises 
above this commercial unit. The accused lived 
elsewhere.
The police applied first for a general warrant 
unders. 487.01 of the Criminal Code for a “sneak 
and peek” to confirm drugs were being stored at 
the stash house. They entered the commercial unit 
in the early  morning hours and found a locked 
wooden box within an interior room. There was a 
safe inside  the wooden box. The police found what 
they believed to be crystal methamphetamine, 
cocaine and marihuana in the wooden box and in 
the safe. They then obtained a general warrant 
giving them a seven (7) day  window in which to 
execute it, conditional upon the  accused’s presence 
at the unit. Since the accused’s attendance at the 
“In summary, in the context of a complex 
and dangerous accident scene and the 
police treatment on site of the [accused] 
anchored in a concern for his safety, the 
detention of the [accused] was lawful; it 
was the antithesis of an ‘arbitrary’ 
detention...” 
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unit was so sporadic and unpredictable, the police 
wanted to execute the warrant just after the 
accused left the commercial unit. They were also 
concerned that the accused’s partner, who lived 
above the unit, or others might destroy the 
evidence if they saw the accused being arrested. 
The police also obtained a general warrant to 
search the accused’s vehicle and home, wanting to 
simultaneously execute searches at all three 
locations. A Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
(CDSA) warrant was ruled out as the police 
reasoned that it would not provide the time and 
flexibility a general warrant would provide. 
The Information to Obtain (ITO) explained that the 
accused was actively engaged in drug trafficking 
and that the execution of a general warrant would 
afford evidence of that activity. These grounds 
included the observations made of drugs in the 
commercial unit upon the execution of the “sneak 
and peek” warrant and the observations of the 
accused’s frequent, but brief and sporadic, entries 
into the locked vacant commercial premises as well 
as the  results of continued surveillance. The ITO 
also set out the affiant’s reasons for believing that it 
was in the  best interests of the administration of 
justice for the warrant to be  issued, and his grounds 
for believing that no other statutory provisions 
permitted the proposed investigative procedure. The 
affiant stated, “[t]his application requires that 
techniques be used to gather evidence as opposed 
to simple search and seizure”. The warrant was 
signed and, when he arrived and then left the 
premises, the accused was arrested a short distance 
a w a y. S i g n i f i c a n t a m o u n t s o f c r y s t a l 
methamphetamine, cocaine, marihuana and other 
drug related materials were seized from the 
commercial unit, the accused’s vehicle and his 
home.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The judge found that the general 
warrant was properly issued under s. 
487.01(1). It allowed the police to defer 
the execution of the warrant until the 
condition of the accused’s attendance at the 
commercial unit was fulfilled. The judge held that 
this prospective search was not available  under a 
conventional search warrant. The accused’s 
Charterchallenge to the validity of the  warrant was 
dismissed and he was convicted of possessing 
drugs for the purpose of trafficking.
BY THE BOOK:
s. 11 Controlled Drugs & Substances Act
s. 11(1) A justice who, on ex parte application, 
is satisfied by information on oath that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that
(a) a controlled substance…in respect of which 
this Act has been contravened,
…
is in a place may, at any time, issue a warrant authorizing a 
peace officer, at any time, to search the place for any such 
controlled substance…and to seize it.
s. 487.01(1) Criminal Code
s. 487.01 (1) A provincial court judge, a judge of a superior 
court of criminal jurisdiction or a judge as defined in section 
552 may issue a warrant in writing authorizing a peace 
officer to, subject to this section, use any device or 
investigative technique or procedure or do any thing 
described in the warrant that would, if not authorized, 
constitute an unreasonable search or seizure in respect of a 
person or a person’s property if
(a) the judge is satisfied by information on oath in writing 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence 
against this or any other Act of Parliament has been or will 
be committed and that information concerning the offence 
will be obtained through the use of the technique, procedure 
or device or the doing of the thing;
(b) the judge is satisfied that it is in the best interests of the 
administration of justice to issue the warrant; and
(c) there is no other provision in this or any other Act of 
Parliament that would provide for a warrant, authorization 
or order permitting the technique, procedure or device to be 
used or the thing to be done.
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Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
trial judge erred in dismissing 
his Charter application to 
exclude the evidence found as 
a result of the general warrants. He contended that 
the investigative technique employed using the 
final general warrant could have equally been 
authorized under the CDSA and, therefore, the 
general warrant was not available to the police. 
General Warrant
Under s. 487.01(1)(c) a  general warrant is not 
available where there is another statutory provision 
that “would provide for a warrant, authorization or 
order permitting the technique, procedure or 
device  to be used or the thing to be done.” The 
Ontario Court of Appeal found a warrant under s. 
11 of the CDSA could have been obtained in this 
case. As the Court of Appeal noted, “s. 11 of 
the CDSA provides that where there are 
reasonable grounds to believe there has been a 
contravention of the law relating to controlled 
substances, and that a controlled substance is in a 
place, a warrant may issue to search that place and 
seize the  substance.”  Here, the police had 
reasonable grounds to believe that prohibited drugs 
were likely to be found in the premises. 
However, simply using a CDSA warrant might not 
have linked the drugs to the  accused. Because the 
search was to be executed in the  future upon the 
occurrence of a specified contingency (the 
accused’s presence at the unit), a conventional 
search warrant was not available. A general 
warrant, on the other hand, was available. 
Although, “a general warrant is to be  ‘used 
sparingly as a warrant of limited resort’ so that it 
does not become an ‘easy back door for other 
techniques that have more demanding pre-
authorization requirements’,” the Court of Appeal 
noted that the  use of a  general warrant is not 
precluded solely because a conventional search 
warrant could have been obtained. A general 
warrant, however, is a  more demanding legislative 
authorization with stricter requirements such that it 
can only be issued by a judge (not a justice of the 
peace) and it must be established that it is in the 
best interests of the administration of justice  to 
issue it. In holding there  was an ample basis for the 
issuing judge to conclude the statutory elements of 
a general warrant were satisfied, the Court of 
Appeal stated:
There is no statutory time limit for the 
execution of conventional search warrants, 
although it appears that the affiant here may 
have believed otherwise. When investigating 
drug related offences, the existence of 
reasonable grounds to believe that drugs are 
present immediately does not necessarily mean 
they will be present days later. Sometimes, a 
larger window for execution of a search 
warrant will be appropriate.
We agree that prospective execution of a 
search, based on a future contingency, together 
with the simultaneous execution of related 
searches are not contempla ted by a 
conventional search warrant. The general 
warrant was properly issued in this case, where 
the investigative technique proposed was not 
simply to seize the drugs but to link them to the 
accused and where there is no issue of evasion 
of a more stringent statutory regime. [para. 
18-19]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
s. 24(2) ANALYSIS ENTITLED TO 
DEFERENCE: LAWYER’s CHILD 
PORN CONVICTION UPHELD
R. v. Schulz, 2018 ONCA 598
After obtaining subscriber details 
associated with a particular IP 
address from Bell Canada, the police 
obtained a  warrant to search the 
accused’s residence for electronic 
devices and documents that might contain 
evidence of child pornography offences. Because 
the accused was a lawyer, the  warrant contained 
special provisions to protect solicitor-client 
pr ivi lege. These provis ions included the 
appointment of a referee to ensure that the search 
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and review of seized documents was conducted in 
ways that would protect solicitor-client privilege. 
The warrant also required the police to place  all 
seized items, unread, in a package and seal the 
package until further order of the court.
The search warrant was executed and the Crown 
subsequently obtained an order specifying the 
method by which a designated examiner could 
copy and review the contents of the seized devices 
for offensive materials. Before filing his report with 
the court and making copies of the seized devices 
available, the  order required the examiner to 
ensure  no privileged information was released to 
the Crown or police.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused challenged the validity of 
the seizure, detention, and examination 
of the seized devices on numerous 
grounds. He applied to exclude all 
evidence obtained from the seized devices on the 
basis that the search had been conducted in a 
manner that infringed his rights under s. 8 of the 
Charter. The judge went on to find several s. 8 
Charter breaches: 
• The police failed to file a report pursuant tos. 
489.1(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Code for one 
month and to apply under s. 490(2) for an 
extension of time beyond 90 days to detain 
the seized items.
• The police failed to seal six seized devices, as 
required by the search warrant. This rendered 
their subsequent search unauthorized by the 
warrant.
• The police failed to return seized devices that 
did not contain offensive materials as required 
by the examination order.
• A police officer failed to take notes of his 
search of the unsealed seized devices. 
The judge considered the s. 8 breacheson both an 
individual basis and cumulatively. He excluded 
from evidence only the six unsealed items for 
which no extension to detain was obtained unders. 
490(2) as well as the devices on which no offensive 
materials were found. The other evidence was 
admitted. The judge concluded that none of the 
breaches resulted from bad faith conduct, save for 
the failure to return devices on which no offensive 
material was found. And, although the accused had 
a high expectation of privacy in respect of all of the 
seized items, there was a strong societal interest in 
the adjudication of the case  on its merits. The 
accused was convicted of possessing child 
pornography. He was sentenced to 45-days 
imprisonment, to be served intermittently, three 
years’ probation, and a 10-year prohibition order 
unders. 161(1)(d). 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused submi t ted , 
among other things, that the 
trial judge erred in her s. 
24(2) Charter analysis by 
failing to properly assess the seriousness of the s. 
8infringements. In his view, the  overall misconduct 
of the police was more  serious than the trial judge 
found.
BY THE BOOK:
s. 8 Charter
Everyone has the right to be secure 
against unreasonable search or seizure. 
s.24(2) Charter
Where , i n p roceed ings under 
subsection (1), a court concludes that 
evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed 
or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by 
this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it 
is established that, having regard to all the 
circumstances, the admission of it in the 
proceedings would bring the administration of 
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s. 24(2) Charter
A considerable amount of deference will be given 
to a trial judge’s three-pronged s. 24(2) analysis 
provided the relevant factors have been considered. 
If a trial judge overlooks or disregards the relevant 
factors, a fresh s. 24(2) analysis is necessary and 
appropriate. 
In this case, the trial judge considered and applied 
the proper factors. She conducted an assessment of 
each individual s. 8 breach and then assessed the 
breaches collectively. Justice Brown, speaking for 
the Court of Appeal, stated:
[T]he trial judge was alive to the fact that some 
of the seized devices contained materials over 
which solicitor-client privilege was asserted. 
She noted that: (i) the failure to seal six items 
involved devices over which no privilege was 
claimed; (ii) the failure to take notes involved 
those same devices; and (iii) no search of the 
seized items occurred during the period prior to 
the filing of thes. 489.1(1)report or before the 
Examination Order was made. There is no 
suggestion in the record that the police seizure 
of the devices or the subsequent review and 
report by the Examiner resulted in the 
disclosure of any privileged information to the 
police or the Crown. As well, the [accused] 
acknowledges that the Crown did not seek to 
adduce any privileged information. [para. 26]
None of the trial judge’s s. 24(2) findings were 
unreasonable and they were supported by the 
evidence. There was no basis for interfering with 
the admission of the evidence and the accused’s 
appeal from conviction was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
STOP RELATED TO HIGHWAY 
SAFETY: ARTICULABLE CAUSE 
NOT REQUIRED
R. v. Gardner, 2018 ONCA 584
At about 11:25 pm a police officer 
received a call that a specific 
individual was suspected to be 
impaired and driving  a green pickup 
truck in a First Nation community. 
Approximately 20 minutes later the officer arrived 
in the community and checked the residence of the 
individual, but he was not home. The officer left the 
residence and began to drive along a road. He saw 
headlights approaching on what appeared to be a 
pickup truck.  It was dark out, and the road had no 
street lighting. The officer activated his emergency 
lights, stopped his 
cruiser, stepped out 
onto the roadway 
a n d f l a g g e d t h e 
vehicle to stop. It was 
a red pickup truck, 
not green one. 
The officer approached the driver’s side of the truck 
and asked the accused to roll down his window 
and identify  himself. The officer told the accused 
that he was looking for an impaired driver. The 
officer smelled the odour of alcohol emanating 
from the vehicle. When asked if he had been 
drinking, the accused responded that he had. The 
accused was asked to step out of the vehicle 
because  there  were other occupants and the officer 
wanted to isolate the source of the alcohol smell. 
Once outside the vehicle, the officer could smell 
alcohol on the accused’s breath. The officer made a 
demand for a roadside breath sample from the 
accused. The accused registered a “fail” and he was 
arrested for driving over 80mg%. He was advised of 
his rights to counsel, cautioned about his right to 
silence and read the breath demand. The accused 
was transported to the police station, declined 
counsel and two breath samples were taken 
resulting in readings of 110 mg% and 107 mg%. 
The accused was charged with driving over 
80mg%.
INTERNATIONAL DAY FOR 
THE ELIMINATION OF 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
November 25
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Ontario Court of Justice
The accused alleged his rights under ss. 
8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of theCharterhad 
been violated. In his view, the police 
had no right to stop his truck because 
the police were engaged in a criminal investigation 
relating to a  specific  individual. Since he was not 
that individual, the police could not rely on their 
Highway Traffic Act (HTA) authority  to stop him. 
This stop triggered an investigative detention and 
he ought to have been given his rights to counsel 
from the moment of its inception. He also 
contended that his s. 8 rights were breached 
because  the officer did not have reasonable and 
probable grounds to make the breath demand. As 
well, he  argued the officer failed to promptly 
inform him of the  proper reason for his detention 
under s. 10(a).
The judge agreed with the accused. The judge 
concluded that the accused was detained for a 
purpose under theCriminal Code, and not pursuant 
to the HTA. Thus, the accused was arbitrarily 
detained. She also found that he should have been 
informed of his rights to counsel immediately upon 
his detention. Moreover, the officer violated the 
accused’s s. 8 Charter rights because he did not 
have grounds to stop the accused’s vehicle. The 
judge also found a s. 10(a) breach but did not 
provide reasons underlying her conclusion. The 
breathalyzer and contemporaneous statements 
were excluded as evidence under s. 24(2) and the 
accused was acquitted on the over 80mg% charge.
Ontario  Superior Court of Justice
The Crown appealed the trial judge’s 
ruling asserting that she erred by finding 
that the police were not permitted to 
detain the accused either under theHTA 
or at common law, and in finding that there had 
been a breach of his rights under s. 10(a) of 
theCharter. The appeal judge, however, upheld the 
trial judge’s finding that this was an investigative 
detention and the police power to stop a vehicle 
under the HTA did not apply in this case. The 
findings of the trial judge could have been 
reasonably reached and her decision was not 
clearly wrong in law. The accused’s acquittal was 
upheld. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown again appealed 
arguing, in part, that the 
appeal judge erred by failing 
to find that the  trial judge 
mischaracterized the nature of the stop. In teh 
Crown’s opinion, the trial judge erroneously ruled 
that the officer was engaged in a  criminal 
investigation and therefore could not rely on the 
HTA to stop the accused’s vehicle to check on the 
sobriety of its driver.
Here, Justice Nordheimer, writing the Court of 
Appeal decision, found “the trial judge erred in 
law in finding that the actions of [the officer] 
constituted only an investigative detention that did 
not include a traffic stop for highway safety 
purposes under the Highway Traffic Act.”  He 
stated:
The purpose for which [the officer] stopped the 
[accused’s] vehicle was to determine if the 
driver of the vehicle was impaired. The fact that 
[the officer] stopped a vehicle, that was not the 
same vehicle for which he had a report of 
possible impaired driving, does not change the 
reason for the stop. The fact that [the officer] 
fortuitously discovered another impaired driver 
is irrelevant to the legal analysis. [The officer] 
had reason to believe that a person was 
operating a pickup truck while impaired. This 
informed [the officer’s] decision to stop the 
[accused’s] pickup truck to determine if the 
driver of the pickup truck was impaired. He 
had the authority to do so under s. 48(1) of 
theHighway Traffic Act. [para. 19]
“Police officers have the right to stop a vehicle for the purpose of checking on the 
sobriety of the driver. This is a power that the police have both at common law and 
through statutes such as the Highway Traffic Act.”
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Since the stopping of the accused’s vehicle  was 
lawful, there was no arbitrary detention:
Police officers have the right to stop a vehicle 
for the purpose of checking on the sobriety of 
the driver. This is a power that the police have 
both at common law and through statutes such 
as theHighway Traffic Act.
The actions of the police in stopping a vehicle 
under their authority at common law or by 
statute only constitutes an unconstitutional stop 
if the reason for the stop is unconnected to a 
highway safety purpose. … 
If the police stop a motorist for a criminal 
investigation unrelated to highway safety, then 
they must have an articulable cause for the 
stop. … [references omitted, paras. 21-23]
Unlike cases where the police stop a motorist to 
investigate criminal activity unrelated to highway 
safety (such as drug activity or theft), the  reason 
underlying the stop in this case was highway safety. 
Had the trial judge properly characterized the stop, 
she would have concluded that it was not an 
investigative detention that would invoke s. 9 of 
theCharter and therefore there was no breach of 
the accused’s rights under ss. 10(a) or 10(b). Justice 
Nordheimer stated:
What I see as apparent from the record is that 
almost immediately upon stopping the 
[accused’s] vehicle, [the officer] advised the 
[accused] that he was looking for an impaired 
driver. He then proceeded to ask questions of 
the [accused] that were directly related to that 
purpose. There cannot have been any doubt in 
the [accused’s] mind as to why his vehicle was 
stopped. Consequently, there is no basis for a 
finding that either the temporal or informational 
elements of the [accused’s] s. 10(a) rights were 
breached.
There was a delay in advising the [accused] of 
his rights to counsel under s. 10(b), but that 
delay was in order to determine whether there 
was a reasonable grounds to believe that the 
[accused] was impaired, such as to warrant a 
roadside breath demand through an Approved 
Screening Device. The Supreme Court of 
Canada confirmed … that giving rights to 
counsel can be delayed during the time 
required to implement a roadside breath 
demand. In this case, once the [accused] failed 
the roadside test, he was immediately advised 
of his rights to counsel. The [appeal judge] 
erred in upholding the trial judge’s conclusion 
that the [accused’s] s. 10(b) rights had been 
violated again, apparently, on the basis that is 
was a finding of fact entitled to deference. It 
was not.
Finally, the trial judge’s finding that there was a 
breach of the [accused’s] s. 8Charter rights to 
be free from unreasonable search and seizure 
flowed from her erroneous conclusion that 
there had been a breach of the [accused’s] s. 9 
rights resulting from an arbitrary detention. I 
have already said that there was no arbitrary 
detention. Both the roadside demand and the 
subsequent breathalyser test are expressly 
authorized by the Criminal Code and were 
properly implemented in this case. Once [the 
officer] smelled alcohol on the [accused’s] 
breath, he was entitled to administer a roadside 
test. When the [accused] failed that roadside 
test, [the officer] was entitled to arrest the 
[accused] and conduct a breathalyser test … . 
Neither of these tests involved any breach of 
the [accused’s] s. 8Charter rights. [references 
omitted, paras. 26-28]
S ince t he t r i a l j udge e r r ed i n f i nd ing 
Charter breaches, she erred in excluding the 
breathalyzer evidence and the accused’s 
statements. The Crown’s appeal was allowed and a 
conviction was entered. The breathalyzer results 
and the accused’s statements made at the time of 
the police stop were sufficient evidence to convict 
the accused of driving over 80mg%. The matter was 
remitted back to the Ontario Court of Justice for 
sentencing.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“The actions of the police in stopping a vehicle under their authority at common law or by 
statute only constitutes an unconstitutional stop if the reason for the stop is 
unconnected to a highway safety purpose.”
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INVENTORY SEARCH 
AUTHORIZED BY LAW: 
NO CHARTER BREACH
R. v. Russell, 2018 BCCA 330
A police officer pulled over a  vehicle 
at about midnight after observing its 
taillights were not illuminated, an 
offence under BC’sMotor Vehicle Act 
Regulations. When the vehicle’s 
licence plate was queried on the police computer, 
the officer learned that its registered owner (the 
accused) was on an undertaking and was not 
allowed to be within the city limits. The accused 
was the  only occupant of the vehicle. He was 
arrested for breaching his undertaking and asked to 
step out of the vehicle. At this time, the officer saw, 
in plain view, a  wallet on the passenger side floor 
of the vehicle and a laptop bag on the passenger 
seat. The accused was arrested, searched incidental 
to the arrest and placed in the rear of the police 
vehicle.
Because the accused had stopped his vehicle in a 
manner that left it straddling the white “fog line”, 
the officer opined it could impede traffic on the 
highway. The officer decided to tow the vehicle 
under s. 188 of BC’s Motor Vehicle Act (MVA) and 
remove it to a compound. When the tow truck 
arrived, the officer gave the vehicle keys to the  tow 
operator and removed the wallet and laptop bag 
from the vehicle for safekeeping until they could be 
returned to the accused upon his release. The 
officer then asked the accused if there was anything 
else he wanted from the vehicle. The accused said 
there  was not and that he wanted the items 
retrieved by the officer left in the vehicle. The 
officer did not put the wallet or laptop bag back, 
instead he took them to the police station where he 
conducted an inventory search of them. In the 
laptop bag drugs were discovered and the accused 
was charged with several drug offences. 
British Columbia Provincial Court
The judge found that the officer was 
authorized under s.188 of theMVA to 
tow the vehicle to a secure  location 
since it was parked in a manner that 
could impede the flow of traffic  and the accused 
was not able to move it. As for the inventory 
search, the  judge concluded that the authority to 
tow a vehicle created the responsibility to secure its 
contents, which may require  conducting an 
inventory search of those contents. In his view, the 
rationale for the officer’s authority to conduct an 
inventory search of the vehicle also justified the 
officer conducting  an inventory search of the 
contents removed from the vehicle, including those 
in the laptop bag.
Moreover, the judge found the search was 
conducted in a  reasonable manner. The failure not 
to allow the accused to make other arrangements to 
move the vehicle was not unreasonable. It was late 
at night, the accused was its only occupant, the 
vehicle was parked in an unsafe location and it 
would have been imprudent for the officer to wait 
at the side of the highway for the accused to make 
calls in order to find someone to pick  up his car. 
Furthermore, the accused had not asked the officer 
to allow him to make other arrangements for the 
vehicle. The judge also rejected the accused’s 
contention that the officer’s true  purpose  in towing 
the vehicle was to search its contents. Rather, the 
judge accepted the officer’s evidence that the sole 
purpose of his search was to secure and safeguard 
BY THE BOOK:
s. 188 BC’s Motor Vehicle Act
If a vehicle is standing or parked …
(d) in a position that causes it to interfere with 
the normal flow of traffic on the highway, …
a peace officer may …
(f) move the vehicle, or require the driver or person in 
charge of the vehicle to move it, to a position determined by 
the peace officer, or
(g) move the vehicle or take the vehicle into his or her 
custody and cause it to be taken to and stored in a safe and 
otherwise suitable place.
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the contents of the laptop bag that was in plain 
view. And, even if the officer had a dual purpose in 
towing the car, it would not necessarily  have been 
improper for the search as long as the officer did 
not go beyond the proper scope of an inventory. 
Finally, there was no duty imposed on the officer to 
return the items to the vehicle after the  accused 
asked him to do so. The officer could not be 
expected to know or ascertain whether the 
accused’s instructions would absolve the officer of 
legal responsibility for the items.
The judge concluded that the inventory search, 
including the warrantless search of the computer 
bag, was authorized by law. It was conducted 
pursuant to statutory authority for the non-
investigative purpose of securing and safeguarding 
the vehicle and its contents while they were in 
police custody.  There was no s. 8 Charter  breach 
and the drugs found in the laptop bag were 
admitted into evidence. The accused was convicted 
of possessing cocaine and methamphetamine for 
the purpose of trafficking and simple possession of 
heroin, GHB, and ketamine.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
To justify a warrantless search, 
the Crown must establish that 
the search was authorized by 
law; the law was reasonable; 
and the search was carried out in a reasonable 
manner. Here, the accused contended that the 
warrantless search was not authorized by law. Thus, 
his s. 8 Charter right was breached and the 
evidence obtained from the unlawful search should 
have been excluded at trial under s. 24(2). 
Justice Smith, however, speaking for the Court of 
Appeal found the  inventory  search to be lawful, 
noting the  jurisprudence in this area was settled. 
“Where a vehicle is lawfully taken into police 
custody (in this case, pursuant to statutory 
authority) the police have the authority, if not the 
duty, to conduct an inventory search of its 
contents,” she said. Section 188, like the impound 
provisions under Part 9 of the MVA, authorizes “the 
police  to take possession of the vehicle  for traffic 
safety  reasons, store  the vehicle in a suitable  place, 
and ensure the security of its contents by 
conducting an inventory search.” Just because s. 
188 does not use the term “impound”, it allows the 
vehicle to be taken into legal custody and therefore 
“the police are authorized to conduct a reasonable 
inventory search of the contents of the vehicle.” 
As for the  validity of the inventory  search, Justice 
Smith stated:
The arresting officer in this case testified at least 
three times that he had taken custody of the 
vehicle pursuant to s.188 of theMVA,and that 
his purpose in retrieving the wallet and laptop 
bag from the vehicle had been to secure and 
safeguard its contents until the vehicle could be 
returned to [the accused]. The judge accepted 
his evidence. The inventory search was 
therefore authorized by law. That the officer 
also acted in accordance with RCMPpolicy(as 
opposed to express statutory authorization to 
search) does not negate or undermine the 
validity of the search of the items lawfully 
seized from the vehicle pursuant to s. 188 of 
theMVA. [para. 33]
The search was neither a  matter of “routine 
practice” by an officer just because they had a 
vehicle towed nor was it done solely on the basis of 
police  administrative procedures, examples of 
circumstances where inventory searches have been 
found not be lawful. Nothing the officer did in this 
case  took the search outside any statutory  or 
common law authority.  
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“Where a vehicle is lawfully taken into police custody (in this case, pursuant to statutory 
authority) the police have the authority, if not the duty, to conduct an inventory search 
of its contents.”
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The number of prohibited 
weapons seized by the 
Canada Border Services 
Agency for fiscal year 2017/18. A fiscal year begins 
on April 1 and ends March 31. Prohibited weapons 
include such items as switchblade knives, tear gas, 
mace, nunchaku sticks, throwing stars, 
bladed finger rings, belt buckle knives, 
fighting chains, push daggers, spiked 
wristbands, steel cobra batons, 
morning stars and brass knuckles. In 
addition, the CBSA seized 751 
firearms during the same period, 
including non-restricted, restricted 
and prohibited firearms,. 
Source: CBSA Seizures for Fiscal Year 2017-2018, accessed August 26, 2018. 
The amount 
of currency 
in Canadian 
dollars that was seized by the CBSA in fiscal 
2017/18. The CBSA also seized $2,831,415 in 
suspected proceeds of crime. 
Source: CBSA Seizures for Fiscal Year 2017-2018, accessed August 26, 2018. 
T h e w e i g h t o f 
cocaine  seized by 
CBSA officials in 
fiscal 2017/18. This was, by far, the  most drugs 
seized. Hashish (949 kgs), marihuana (497 kgs) and 
heroin (190 kgs) followed. Furthermore, there  were 
15,900 kgs, 4,987 litres and 948,108 dosages of 
other narcotics, drugs and chemicals seized. 
Source: CBSA Seizures for Fiscal Year 2017-2018, accessed August 26, 2018. 
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The number of litres of 
alcohol the  CBSA seized 
during fiscal 2017/18. In 
addition, there were 343,098 cartons of tobacco 
products and 90,081 kgs of tobacco seized.
Source: CBSA Seizures for Fiscal Year 2017-2018, accessed August 26, 2018. 
The number of people detained 
by the CBSA in the first quarter 
of fiscal 2017/18. This involved 
1,978 detentions in a CBSA facility (Immigration 
Holding  Centre) and another 838 detentions in a 
non-CBSA facility.
Source: CBSA Quarterly Detention Statistics – 2017-2018, accessed August 
26, 2018. 
...is the length 
m o s t p e o p l e 
were detained by the CBSA in each fiscal quarter.
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The region with the most people under CBSA detention in fiscal 2017/18. This 
was followed by BC and the Yukon, Quebec, the Prairie provinces and then the 
Atlantic provinces. 
Ontario
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ARREST UNLAWFUL: 
OFFICER FAILED TO CONFIRM 
WARRANT
R. v. Kossick, 2018 SKCA 55 
A police officer on patrol spotted the 
accused, a cyclist, who he recognized 
from previous interactions. The officer 
was aware the accused was a  suspect 
in a recent bicycle theft. He had 
received an email about nine days earlier from a 
colleague that a  warrant for the accused’s arrest had 
been requested. The officer radioed his colleague 
and was informed that the accused could be 
arrested.  The officer followed the accused and ran 
his name on the police computer but did not read 
or review the computer information to confirm the 
existence of the warrant, which had actually been 
executed four days earlier. 
The officer stopped the accused in an empty 
parking lot, advised him he was under arrest for 
theft under $5,000, placed him in handcuffs and 
searched him incident to arrest. In the  accused’s 
pockets, the officer found $90 cash, two cellphones 
and a baggie of methamphetamine weighing 3.82 
grams.After the search, the accused told the officer 
that he had already been arrested and released in 
relation to the bike theft. The officer then checked 
the police  databases and confirmed the accused’s 
earlier arrest. The officer informed the accused he 
was no longer under arrest for the bike theft but, 
instead, was now under arrest for possessing a 
controlled substance and breaching his release 
conditions. 
While in the  backseat of the patrol vehicle, the 
accused picked up one of his cellphones and began 
to manipulate  it. The officer took the cellphone to 
prevent the accused from contacting anyone while 
in custody and as a safety precaution. He placed 
the cellphone atop his duty bag on the front 
passenger seat. The officer then observed it receive 
several message notifications and did not have to 
touch the cellphone to see incoming messages.At 
the police station, the  officer again observed the 
cellphone receiving messages, the nature and 
number of which led him to believe they  were 
related to the methamphetamine he had seized 
from the  accused. The officer then opened the 
cellphone by pressing a button and scrolled up and 
down to view the content of the messages. He even 
responded to two of the  messages. After the 
accused was placed in cells, the officer went to the 
exhibit room to make notes about what he had 
observed on the cellphone. He also answered two 
incoming calls and listened to audio messages on 
the cellphone. The accused was then arrested for 
possessing methamphetamine for the purpose of 
trafficking and possessing property obtained or 
derived from a crime. More than five months later, 
the officer obtained a search warrant for the 
cellphone which was subsequently examined and 
the contents of the accused’s pre-arrest messages 
were analyzed. This led to charges of possessing 
methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, 
possessing property obtained or derived from 
crime, breach of undertaking for failing to keep the 
peace, and breach of undertaking for possessing 
non-prescription drugs.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The accused argued that his arrest for 
bike theft breached his s. 9Charterrights 
and that the searches of his person and 
cell phone incident to that arrest had 
breached his s. 8rights. In his view, the evidence of 
the drugs, cash, cellphones and data extracted from 
the cellphones ought to have been excluded under 
s. 24(2).
The judge found the bike theft arrest unlawful. 
Although the officer subjectively believed there was 
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an arrest warrant, the officer’s belief was not 
objectively reasonable. The officer could have 
reasonably made enquiries to discover that his 
colleague’s advice was defective by taking the time 
to access the  police database information that the 
arrest warrant had been executed. Therefore, the 
accused was arbitrarily  detained under s. 9 of 
theCharter and the  searches incident to that arrest 
breached s. 8. The judge also found the four 
searches of the accused’s cellphone - in the patrol 
vehicle, in detention at the  police station, in the 
exhibit room andpursuant to the warrant - had not 
complied with the requirements set down inR. v. 
Fearon, 2014 SCC 77. The judge went on to 
exclude the evidence under s. 24(2). The accused 
was acquitted of all charges. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the 
accused’s acquittals arguing 
that the trial judge erred by 
finding the arrest unlawful, the 
searches unreasonable and in excluding the 
evidence. 
The Arrest
Since the warrant authorizing the accused’s arrest 
had already been executed, the Crown had the the 
burden of proving the officer had reasonable 
grounds for the  arrest. This would require  proof that 
the officer subjectively believed the accused was 
s u b j e c t t o a n a r r e s t w a r r a n t o r w a s 
otherwisearrestableand that this subjective belief 
was objectively reasonable.
The Crown submitted that the police can make a 
valid, warrantless arrest based on erroneous 
information. Justice Caldwell, delivering  the Court 
of Appeal judgement agreed, but found such a 
broad statement was not without qualification. 
“Police  reliance on erroneous information may be 
considered objectively  reasonable ‘unless, in the 
circumstances at play in the arrest situation, the 
police  could reasonably have made inquiries which 
would have led to the discovery of the deficiencies 
or defects’ in that information,” he said. Justice 
Caldwell continued:
With the question of law settled, the key 
difficulty with the Crown’s argument against the 
finding of an unlawful arrest is that the judge 
“Police reliance on erroneous information may be considered objectively reasonable 
‘unless, in the circumstances at play in the arrest situation, the police could reasonably 
have made inquiries which would have led to the discovery of the deficiencies or defects’ 
in that information.”
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Fearon criteria
“To summarize, police officers will not be justified 
in searching a cell phone or similar device 
incidental to every arrest. Rather, such a search will 
comply with s. 8 where:
(1)  The arrest was lawful;
(2) The search is truly incidental to the arrest in that the police have a 
reason based on a valid law enforcement purpose to conduct the 
search, and that reason is objectively reasonable. The valid law 
enforcement purposes in this context are:
 (a)  Protecting the police, the accused, or the public;
 (b) Preserving evidence; or
 (c) Discovering evidence, including locating additional suspects, 
in situations in which the investigation will be stymied or 
significantly hampered absent the ability to promptly search the 
cell phone incident to arrest;
(3) The nature and the extent of the search are tailored to the purpose 
of the search; and
(4) The police take detailed notes of what they have examined on the 
device and how it was searched.” 
Supreme Court of Canada  Justice Cromwell in R. v. Fearon, 2014 SCC
77 at para. 83.
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found the circumstances had reasonably 
permitted [the officer] to inquire into the 
veracity of the information he had received 
from [his colleague], which had formed the 
basis of the grounds for arrest. Frankly, I can 
find no flaw in the judge’s finding that the 
circumstances reasonably allowed [the officer] 
the time to verify the information he had 
received from [his colleague].
… [T]he “evolving circumstances” giving rise to 
[the accused’s] arrest did not preclude [the 
officer] from inquiring into the reliability of [his 
colleague's] advice. [The officer] had the 
means to do so and, in fact, had started down 
that path by keying [the accused’s] name into 
SIMS just before he pulled him over. The 
information about [the accused] on SIMS was 
readily-accessible and correct. [The officer] was 
an experienced police officer who was very 
familiar with CPIC and SIMS. However, he did 
not access or read the information about [the 
accused] available on SIMS until after he had 
arrested him.
Finally, the circumstances of [the accused’s] 
arrest did not require [the officer] to make a 
quick decision on the information he had been 
told. The judge addressed this in more 
particular terms. She questioned [the officer’s] 
testimony to the effect that he could not have 
made inquiries on CPIC or SIMS prior to 
arresting [the accused]. She observed that [the 
officer] knew [the accused] and knew where he 
lived—i.e., knew where to locate him if he 
were to avoid arrest—leading her to conclude 
there was no real sense of urgency in the arrest. 
Furthermore, [the accused] was on a bike and 
[the officer] was in a patrol vehicle. [The 
officer] testified that, after seeing [the accused], 
he took the time to call [his colleague]. He then 
waited to proceed through the intersection and 
followed [the accused]. At this time he typed 
[the accused’s] name into SIMS and was able to 
do so without losing sight of him. [The officer] 
then followed [the accused] “on the street until 
he was able to make a stop with him in a safe 
place.” Once [the officer] saw an empty 
parking lot, he signalled [the accused] to pull 
over into it and [the accused] complied with 
his commands. [reference omitted, paras. 
32-34]
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge did not 
err in her conclusion that the officer could have 
reasonably made inquiries that would have 
disclosed the inaccuracy in the information he had 
received from his colleague. 
The Searches
For a search to be reasonable as an incident to 
arrest, the arrest must be lawful. Since the 
accused’s arrest was found to be unlawful, the 
s ea rch tha t uncove red the ce l l phones , 
methamphetamine and cash was unreasonable and 
a breach of s. 8 of the Charter. The seizure of the 
cellphone in the  patrol vehicle and the viewing of 
the message  notifications it received was also 
unreasonable.
The Crown, nevertheless, contended the trial judge 
erred in applying theFearoncriteria to all four of 
the cellphone searches. In the crown’s opinion, the 
plain view doctrine applied to the first and second 
searches of the cellphone. But the Court of Appeal 
reasoned otherwise:
1. In the patrol vehicle: The facts of this case did 
not invoke the plain view doctrine. “The plain 
view doctrine cannot save a  search conducted 
incident to an unlawful arrest,” said Justice 
Caldwell. In order for plain view to be a  valid 
authority, the police must be lawfully in a 
position from which the evidence was plainly 
in view. Here, the accused’s arrest was 
unlawful and therefore the police were  not 
lawfully in a place to support their plain view 
discovery. Furthermore, there was no evidence 
the officer had probable cause to associate the 
messages received on the cellphone in his 
patrol vehicle with any criminal activity. He 
said he  could only see the cellphone had 
received a number of messages and the names 
of the message senders. It wasn’t until the 
second search that he  was able to read their 
full content and then formed his belief they 
were related to methamphetamine trafficking. 
2. At the police  station: The plain view doctrine 
did not apply because the officer had to open 
the phone and press a button, and scroll 
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through and review the messages it had 
received. At this point, the officer was 
conducting  an exploratory search of the phone 
and not simply relying on a plain view 
seizure. 
3. In the exhibit room: When the officer went to 
an exhibit room at the police station to make 
notes of the messages he had earlier reviewed 
he answered two incoming calls and listened 
to several voice messages. This action did not 
satisfy the Fearon criteria. 
4. With the warrant: Since the initial searches of 
the cellphone were unreasonable, then the 
search pursuant to the warrant was also 
unreasonable because the warrant was granted 
on the basis of the initial searches. 
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge applied 
the appropriate legal framework in her s. 24(2) 
analysis and did not err in excluding the evidence. 
The Crown’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org

ARREST MADE IN GOOD FAITH:
EVIDENCE ADMITTED
R. v. Maxim, 2018 SKCA 57
A Saskatchewan police officer, with 
training and significant experience 
dealing with signals and warning 
signs associated with individuals 
transporting contraband and illegal 
goods, had a motorist stopped at the side of the 
highway with his emergency lights flashing. When 
the accused passed by at 89 km/h, he did not slow 
to the required 60 km/h and he was pulled over. 
The accused produced a BC driver’s licence 
addressed to Burnaby – believed to be a  source 
point of drugs - and a vehicle rental agreement 
from Regina. His hands were shaking when he 
handed over the documents, indicating he was 
nervous. He said he was coming from Regina and 
going to Winnipeg to visit family. The officer 
checked a police database and learned the accused 
had previously been charged with trafficking in 
marihuana five  years earlier and was suspected of 
producing marihuana three years earlier. The officer 
also noted that the vehicle was to be  returned to 
the rental company in two days. He found it odd 
that the accused would be travelling to see friends 
in Winnipeg - known in police circles to be a 
destination for drugs - on a  long weekend and 
t rave l l ing on Monday 
morning, the last day of the 
weekend. This short period 
of travel, in the officer’s 
view, was consistent with 
carrying contraband. The 
officer was also aware that 
the use of a rental vehicle 
was a common way to carry 
contraband because there is 
no risk of a personal vehicle 
being seized by the  police. 
In addition, the officer saw 
a n e n e r g y d r i n k - a 
stimulant used to travel 
long distances - in the front 
seat console.
The officer detained the accused for a drug 
investigation and provided his rights to counsel and 
police  warning. The accused did not appear 
surprised by being detained but his visible level of 
nervousness increased including a pulsating carotid 
artery. The officer performed a pat down search and 
found a large  wad of cash in the accused’s pocket 
(later determined to be $1,040). In the officer’s 
view, this amount was consistent with a drug 
payment. Although the officer had a drug sniffing 
dog with him, he did not use it because he was 
confident the accused had drugs. The officer 
arrested the accused for possessing a narcotic 
(some 30 minutes after the stop but only five 
minutes after the investigative detention). He was 
again given his right to counsel and the police 
warning. The officer searched the  accused’s trunk 
and located two suitcases containing a total of forty 
pounds of marihuana in vacuum sealed packages. 
The officer then rearrested the accused for 
possessing a narcotic for the purpose of 
trafficking. He was subsequently  charged with 
possessing cannabis marihuana for the purpose  of 
trafficking under the  Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act (CDSA). 
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Saskatchewan Provincial Court
At trial, the officer admitted that he 
knew nothing about the accused’s 
background. He said he did not smell 
any drugs or alcohol in the vehicle nor 
anything that could be used as a masking agent. He 
also did he see any drugs or alcohol in the vehicle. 
The officer also said that most people stopped by 
the police are nervous, but the accused exhibited 
more than the base line level of nervousness that he 
would expect.The officer testified that the amount 
of cash found on the accused, his throbbing carotid 
artery and his demeanor in not appearing to be 
surprised after he was detained for a drug 
investigation elevated his grounds and led to the 
arrest.
The judge found the accused had been lawfully 
stopped under Saskatchewan’s Traffic  Safety Act. 
Then the officer acquired a reasonable suspicion 
that the accused had violated or was violating  the 
CDSA and lawfully detained him for that 
investigation. The arrest, however, was found to be 
unlawful because the  officer did not have 
reasonable grounds to make it. The three additional 
factors acquired after detention – the cash, the 
accused’s throbbing carotid artery and his non-
surprised demeanor to being detained for a drug 
investigation - were not sufficient to elevate the 
reasonable suspicion for detention to reasonable 
grounds for arrest. Therefore, the judge  concluded 
that the accused’s ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights had 
been breached. 
The judge did, however, find that the admission of 
the evidence would not bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute under s. 24(2) of theCharter. 
The Charter breach fell at the lowest end of the 
severity spectrum because the grounds for arrest fell 
just short. The officer did not act in bad faith, did 
not exhibit a intentional or blatant disregard for the 
accused’s rights, and his actions were not part of a 
systemic problem or borne from wilful blindness. 
The impact of the breach on the accused was in the 
medium range because the search of a rented 
vehicle involved a reduced sense of privacy and did 
not give rise to issues of bodily integrity or human 
dignity. Finally, society’s interest in the  case’s 
adjudication on its merits supported admission. As 
a result, the accused was convicted.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
  
The accused argued that the 
trial judge erred in his s. 24(2) 
analysis. He asserted, among 
other things, that the trial 
judge failed to take into account the  officer’s level 
of experience and training when he considered the 
seriousness of the breach, as well as the officer’s 
failure to employ the drug detection dog. These 
factors, he suggested, should have elevated the 
offending police  behaviour to the “serious” end of 
the spectrum.As for the impact of the breaches on 
his Charter-protected interests, he contended that a 
person had a substantial privacy interest in a 
vehicle and he intended on preserving his privacy 
by locking the luggage. Finally, he  argued that the 
trial judge placed too much weight on society’s 
interest in the case.In his view, the  evidence ought 
to have been excluded under s. 24(2). 
 
The Crown, on the other hand, suggested the trial 
judge’s conclusions were reasonable. The breaches 
were not serious, they did not significantly impact 
the accused’s Charter-protected interests, and 
society had an interest in seeing the charges 
determined on its merits. Moreover, the Crown 
suggested the accused’s Charter rights were not 
actually breached. 
In this case, Justice Herauf speaking for the Court of 
Appeal found the trial judge did not err in her s. 
24(2) analysis:
The trial judge made a finding of fact that the 
police officer did not deliberately seek to 
violateCharter rights, but instead acted out of 
an honest, albeit mistaken, belief that his 
conduct was Charter compliant. In my view, 
[the accused’s] attempt to characterize [the 
officer’s] actions as being at the high end of the 
seriousness spectrum of offending police 
behaviour, that [the officer’s] decision not to 
use the drug detection dog as “arrogant” and 
that his decision to arrest was made in bad faith 
are not supported by the evidence. [para. 13]
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At most, the trial judge found the officer’s decision 
to not use the  drug detection dog as negligent 
which would not place it at the high end of the 
fault spectrum. Furthermore, the trial judge held the 
officer’s grounds supported a  reasonable suspicion 
and fell just short of the reasonable grounds 
standard. 
As for the impact on the accused’s Charter-
protected interests, there is a lesser expectation of 
privacy in an automobile and there had been no 
unjustified or intrusive strip search or body cavity 
search. Finally, the offence was serious, the 
evidence was reliable and important to the Crown’s 
case.  The trial judge made no error in admitting the 
evidence. Since the evidence was admissible, there 
was no need for the Court of Appeal to consider the 
Crown’s alternative argument that their were no 
breaches of the accused’s Charter rights. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
 
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Maxim, 2017 SKPC 37.
REASONABLE GROUNDS 
STANDARD LESS THAN 
BALANCE OF PROBABILITIES
R. v. Ha, 2018 ABCA 233

On an un re l a t ed ma t t e r, an 
experienced drug investigator was 
conducting surveillance from his 
covert vehicle in a parking lot 
associated with a shopping centre 
and grocery store. He saw a red Nissan Maxima 
with a lone occupant enter the parking lot, pass 
slowly in front of his vehicle, and then park with its 
engine running in an area of the lot where there 
were no vehicles within a 30 to 50 foot radius. The 
officer thought that the person in the Maxima may 
be waiting for someone. The driver of the Maxima 
did not exit the vehicle, and the vehicle did not 
move for about three minutes. The officer queried 
the vehicle’s licence plate and determined that it 
was registered to a Dean Thomas, born in 1969. A 
few minutes later, the Maxima drove past the 
officer’s parked vehicle and moved to another 
location in the parking lot. After briefly losing sight 
of the vehicle, the officer regained visual contact 
and observed the front passenger door of the 
Maxima open and an Asian male get out and walk 
about 30 to 40 feet to a nearby Honda Acura. The 
Asian male was looking around the parking lot, 
alert to his surroundings. 
The officer queried the Acura’s licence plate  and 
learned it was registered to a Michael Ha, born in 
1983. The officer believed that he had witnessed an 
apparent drug transaction between the driver of the 
Maxima and the driver of the Acura, and that he 
could arrest both individuals. The officer broadcast 
the observed transaction over his police radio and 
asked if anyone was familiar with either a Dean 
Thomas or Michael Ha. The officer’s sergeant 
responded that Michael Ha - who had a cleft palate 
- was a high-level drug dealer and most likely a 
supplier. The officer then radioed for assistance  and 
directed two other officers to arrest the occupants 
of the Acura for possessing a controlled substance 
for the purpose of trafficking. When the arresting 
officer stopped the Acura and approached it, he 
noticed its Asian male driver had a distinctive cleft 
palate scar. The vehicle was searched and police 
found drugs and cash. 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The officer testified that, prior to 
speaking to his sergeant, he had 
reasonable grounds to arrest the 
accused. However, the arrest was not 
actually directed until after he spoke to his 
sergeant. The judge ruled that the  officer had the 
necessary  reasonable  grounds to make the arrest. 
He found the officer believed that he had witnessed 
a drug transaction between the driver of the 
Maxima and the driver of the Acura, and that he 
had grounds to arrest both individuals. This belief 
was based on the officer’s experience in drug 
investigations. He was a seven year veteran with a 
year-and-a-half  in the gang and drugs unit and he 
had participated in about 30 drug investigations 
and 75 drug transactions. As well, “the cars were 
located in an isolated area in the parking lot. The 
transaction was a quick one, no more than two 
minutes. And the transaction took place inside a 
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vehicle where the exact interaction could not be 
observed.”  Therefore, there were no breaches of 
the accused’s ss. 8 or 9Charterrights.
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused submitted that 
there  was no reasonable 
grounds for his arrest. In his 
view, the officer’s decision to 
arrest based solely on his observations in the 
parking lot was not objectively reasonable. And, 
even if the  information from the officer’s sergeant 
could be considered, he maintained the totality of 
the evidence nevertheless fell short.As a result of 
thisCharterbreach, the drugs and cash found upon 
the unreasonable search of his motor vehicle ought 
to have been excluded under s 24(2). The Crown 
contended, however, that the officer obtained 
additional information from his sergeant before he 
directed the arrest, which he was allowed to 
consider in forming his grounds. His observations 
plus the information that Michael Ha was a drug 
dealer and was likely  a supplier rendered the 
officer’s grounds objectively reasonable.
Reasonable Grounds for Arrest
In describing the reasonable  grounds standard for 
arrest, a two member majority  of the Court of 
Appeal stated:
Charter-compliant “reasonable and probable 
grounds” have a subjective and an objective 
component. The arresting officer must 
subjectively have reasonable and probable 
grounds on which to base the arrest. The 
grounds must also be justifiable from an 
objective point of view such that a reasonable 
person placed in the position of the arresting 
officer, must be able to conclude that there 
were reasonable and probable grounds for the 
arrest. Police are not, however, required to 
establish a prima facie case for a conviction 
before making an arrest. [para. 18]
In this case, there was no dispute that the officer 
subjectivelybelieved he had grounds for the arrest. 
Subjective belief alone, however, is insufficient. The 
objective component must also be established 
based on a consideration of the entire  constellation 
of factors. In assessing whether objective 
reasonable grounds exists, the majority made the 
following comments:
• “It is trite that the question of the existence of 
reasonable and probable grounds cannot be 
informed by what the police found subsequent 
to arrest, or on the basis of the whole of the 
evidence at the trial.” [para. 23]
• “[I]it is only the point at which the accused’s 
liberty is actually interfered with that the 
assessment of the constitutionality of the arrest 
becomes relevant.” [para. 24]
• “Whether thetotalityof the evidence supports an 
objective finding of reasonable and probable 
grounds to arrest, is assessed through the eyes of 
the reasonable person with the experience and 
knowledge of the arresting officer.” [para. 28]
• “[T]he mere fact that there may be other 
plausible, innocent explanations for a 
transaction observed by a police officer does not 
prevent, or preclude, the formation by an 
experienced, knowledgeable police officer of 
reasonable and probable grounds that she or he 
is observing an illegal transaction. Put another 
way, the presence of other possible, plausible, 
innocent explanations for police-observed 
behaviour does not legally or automatically 
negate credibly-based probability, that is, 
reasonable and probable grounds.” [paras. 
33-34]
• “[T]he test is not balance of probabilities, or 
exclusion of any other rational inference; rather, 
the test is … subjective grounds justifiable on an 
objective basis, but not requiring a prima 
facie case for conviction. As has been stated 
many times, the ‘reasonable grounds’ standard is 
not only less than that required for conviction, 
“Whether the totality of the evidence supports an objective finding of reasonable and 
probable grounds to arrest, is assessed through the eyes of the reasonable person with 
the experience and knowledge of the arresting officer.”
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but is also less than the civil standard of 
proof.” [para. 35]
• “[T]he standard of credibly-based probability 
neither requires an officer to satisfy him or 
herself that there is evidence of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt nor even aprima faciecase. It 
is self-evident that only information that a police 
officer has good reason to believe is unreliable 
can be disregarded, and equivocal or 
e x c u l p a t o r y i n f o r m a t i o n c a n n o t b e 
ignored.” [para. 36]
• “The material inquiry is not whether particular 
conduct is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty’; the test is 
‘whether a reasonable person in the position of 
the officer would conclude that there were 
reasonable and probable grounds’.” [para. 37]
• “The reality is that arrest is a dynamic, and in 
this case, a collective process, not a frozen 
moment in time. While it is likely the arrest 
commenced, as defence counsel urged, at the 
moment the police ‘turned on the cherries’, 
arrest is not complete until the liberty of the 
subject is restrained.” [para. 39]
Applying these points to this case, the majority 
concluded that the trial judge correctly found that 
reasonable and probable grounds for the accused 
arrest had been established on the totality of the 
evidence. There was no reason for the  officer to 
question the trustworthiness of the  information 
provided by his sergeant. The officer’s observation 
of a suspected drug transaction between the drivers 
of the two vehicles, given his experience in drug 
investigations, combined with the  information 
provided by his sergeant were sufficient to ground 
objective reasonableness. In other words, the 
factors that formed the bases for the officer’s belief 
were objectively reasonable. Thus, the accused’s ss. 
8 or 9Charterrights were not violated.
A Concurrent View

Justice Slatter wrote his own opinion. In 
reviewing whether the officer had the 
necessary grounds for arrest, he 
reviewed (1) the standard of proof or 
knowledge that an officer must have, (2) the point 
in time at which the knowledge of the officer is to 
be measured, (3) the information police  are entitled 
to rely on, and (4) the evidence or inferences that a 
judge can use  in assessing whether and officer had 
reasonable grounds.  
Justice Slatter first noted, “the criminal law … 
continues to engage numerous standards of proof, 
some of them driven by statutory provisions: 
reasonable grounds to suspect; reasonable 
grounds to believe, or reasonable and probable 
grounds ; pr ima fac ie case; ba lance of 
probabilities; and proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” He went on and reviewed these various 
standards to conclude:
In summary, “reasonable grounds to believe” 
requires a factually based likelihood that there are 
grounds for the arrest, rising above mere suspicion, 
but not necessarily demonstrating grounds on a 
balance of probabilities. The test must be applied 
in a common sense manner, having regard to the 
circumstances in which the police find themselves, 
and the entire constellation of facts. The court must 
ask if there are objectively verifiable facts that 
would have caused a reasonable person with the 
training and experience of the police officer, who 
was aware of the information known to the officer, 
to believe in the facts supporting the arrest. [para. 
70]

As for when an officer must have “reasonable 
grounds to believe”, Justice Slatter found those 
grounds need not be tested at the moment the 
subjective decision to make an arrest is made, but 
when the arrest was actually made: 
[I]n determining whether reasonable grounds to 
arrest existed, the court must examine all of the 
information available to the officers up to and 
including the moment when they stopped the 
Acura and arrested the [accused]. By that time, 
in addition to all the other information they 
had, they would have been able to observe that 
“The material inquiry is not whether 
particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty’; 
the test is ‘whether a reasonable person 
in the position of the officer would 
conclude that there were reasonable and 
probable grounds’.”
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the driver of the vehicle was an Asian male 
with a cleft palate scar. [para. 75]
As for what information the officers could rely on, 
Justice Slatter rejected the accused’s argument that 
the officer who made the decision to arrest could 
only  consider the information actually known to 
him in determining whether he  had reasonable 
grounds. “Policing is a team sport,” said Justie 
Slatter. “When a squad of police officers engage in 
any activity, such as an arrest or search, the 
knowledge of the  entire  group is relevant. In many 
investigations there will be no one officer who 
knew all of the relevant information about the 
situation.” He continued:
[O]ne police officer can rely on information 
conveyed by another without inquiring into the 
reliability or source of that information. 
Information exchanged between the police is 
not subject to the same scrutiny as information 
received from confidential informants or 
civilians. If the conveyed information is later 
shown to be reliable, it can be used to justify 
the arrest.
It follows that when a reviewing court is 
examining whether there were reasonable 
grounds for the arrest, it is the knowledge of the 
police team that is relevant, not just the 
knowledge of the individual officer who may 
have actually detained the suspect. [paras. 
79-80]
Finally, Justice  Slatter looked at what evidence and 
inferences a court could use in determining 
whether an officer had reasonable grounds. On this 
point, he stated:
• “The police are not entitled to make an arrest 
based on mere suspicion or hunches. The belief 
behind the arrest must be objectively reasonable, 
which means that it must be based on the 
information known to the arresting team.”[para. 
81]
• “Mere speculation, or postulating other 
hypothetical explanations for events, are not 
necessarily sufficient to negate a reasonable 
belief in grounds for an arrest. The absence of 
evidence or a plausible innocent alternative can 
raise a reasonable doubt. A plausible innocent 
alternative does not, however, preclude 
establishing ‘objectively reasonable grounds to 
believe’, or even necessarily preclude proof on a 
balance of probabilities. The mere fact that there 
might be an equally plausible innocent 
explanation for what the police regarded as 
being suspicious does not prevent the police 
from having ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ they 
observed a crime in progress.” [para. 82] 
• “Factors that areexclusivelyinnocuous generally 
cannot be combined together to provide 
reasonable grounds to believe an offence has 
occurred. However, factors that can support both 
an innocuous and a suspicious conclusion can 
be “mutually reinforcing” or can be combined 
together to provide reasonable grounds, because 
the mere fact that an observation might have an 
innocent explanation does not prevent a police 
officer from having reasonable grounds to 
believe that it was sinister in nature.” [para. 84]
• “‘Reasonable grounds to believe’ do not depend 
on the police’s view of the scenario being more 
probable than not. Even if it is possible that a 
brief suspicious interaction in a parking lot is 
innocent in fact, or is capable of an innocent 
explanation, that does not prevent the police 
officers from forming a reasonably based belief 
that the transaction is criminal in nature… Even 
if it is a ‘50-50 proposition’ as to whether the 
transaction is innocent or criminal, it may still 
form the basis of an objectively reasonable belief 
in the criminal scenario. An observation does not 
have to be overtly and exclusively criminal to 
provide justification for an arrest. Therefore, if 
the police view a suspicious interaction in a dark 
parking lot they may form a reasonable belief 
that it is a criminal transaction, even if some 
people who buy things on the Internet close their 
transactions in this way.” [para. 89]
• “Whether there are reasonable grounds to 
believe in the facts supporting the arrest is an 
inference that must be examined based on the 
particular facts known to the police.” [para. 90]

In this case, Justice Slatter found all of the observed 
facts, while not conclusive of criminal activity, 
considered collectively in light of the police 
officers’ experience were sufficient to provide a 
reasonable belief that criminal activity had been 
observed. The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
[…]
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ILLICT DRUG OVERDOSE 
DEATHS IN 2018
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has released 
statistics for illicit drug overdose deaths in the 
province from January 1, 2008 to June 30, 2018. In 
June there were 105 suspected drug overdose 
deaths. This represents a -15% decrease over the 
number of deaths occurring in June 2017 and a 
-8% decrease over May 2018. The June 2018 
statistics amount to about 3.5 people dying 
every day of the month.
In May there were 105 suspected drug overdose 
deaths. This represents an 19% decrease over the 
number of deaths occurring in May 2017. 
There were a total of 742 illicit drug overdose 
deaths from January through June 2018. This is 74 
fewer deaths than last year’s total at this time.  
The 1,449  overdose deaths last year amounted to 
more than a 335% over 2013. Moreover, the report 
attributes fentanyl laced drugs as accounting for the 
increase in deaths. 
People aged 30-39 were  the hardest hit so far in 
2018 with 192  illicit drug  overdose deaths 
followed by 50-59 year-olds at 173  deaths. People 
aged 40-49 years-old had 161  deaths while those 
aged 19-29 had 144  deaths. Vancouver had the 
most deaths at 193 followed by Surrey (111), 
Victoria (47), Kelowna (31), Prince George (25) and 
Kamloops (22). 
Males continue to die at almost a 4:1 ratio 
compared to females. From January to June 2018, 
591 males have died while there were 151 female 
deaths.
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The 2018 data indicates that most illicit drug 
overdose deaths (88.2%) occurred inside while 
10.6% occurred outside. For nine (9) deaths, the 
location was unknown. 
“Private residence” includes 
residences, driveways, garages, 
trailer homes.
“Other residence” includes hotels, motels, rooming 
houses, shelters, etc.
“Other inside” includes facilities, occupational sites, 
public buildings and businesses.
“Outside” includes vehicles, streets, sidewalks,  parks, 
wooded areas, campgrounds and parking lots.
DEATHS SINCE PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY
In April 2016, BC’s provincial health officer 
declared a public health emergency in response to 
the rise in drug overdoses and deaths. The number 
of overdose deaths in the 27 months preceding the 
declaration (Jan 2014-Mar 2016) totaled 1,114. 
The number of deaths in the 27 months following 
the declaration (April 2016-June 2018) totaled 
2,967. This is an increase of 166%.
979
35
177 442
Private Residence
Other Residence
Other Inside
Outside
Unknown
Deaths by location: Jan-Feb 2018
Source: -Illicit Drug Overdose Deaths in BC - January 1, 2008 to 
June 30, 2018.  Ministry of Justice, Office of the Chief Coroner. 
August 2, 2018.
TYPES OF DRUGS
The top four detected drugs relevant to illicit drug overdose deaths from 2016 - 2018 were fentanyl, which 
was detected in 75.3% of deaths, cocaine (48.2%), methamphetamine/amphetamine (31.6%), and heroin 
(24.3%). 
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2017 POLICE REPORTED CRIME
In July 2018 Statistics Canada 
released its “Police-reported 
crime statistics in Canada, 
2017” report. Highlights of this 
recent collection of crime data 
include:
• There were 1,958,023 crimes (excluding traffic) 
reported to Canadian police in 2017; this 
represents 45,271 more crimes reported when 
compared to 2016.
• The total crime rate  increased +1%. This includes 
a violent crime rate  rise of +3% and a property 
crime rate rise of +1%.
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T=Total Crime Severity Index
V=Violent Crime Severity Index
NV=Non-Violent Crime Severity Index
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Police-Reported Crime Severity Indexes
Police-Reported Impaired Driving Offences
Province Rate Impaired Driving 
Offences
Rate change 
2016 to 2017
SK 529 6,153 -5%
PEI 280 426 -14%
AB 273 11,683 -6%
MB 270 3,612 +5%
NS 266 2,536 +1%
NF 266 1,409 +3%
NB 236 1,793 +6%
BC 229 11,042 -5%
QC 168 14,121 -11%
ON 101 14,396 -4%
The Crime Severity Index (CSI) is another measure of police-reported crime. 
Each offence is assigned a weight, derived from sentences handed down by 
criminal courts. The more serious the average sentence, the higher the offence is 
weighted. The weighted offences are then summed and divided by the population. 
An overall CSI has been created as well as a violent CSI and non-violent CSI.
Source: Statistics Canada, 2016, “Police-reported crime statistics in 
Canada, 2015, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on July 23, 2018.
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Police-Reported Crime Rates per 100,000 population
Canada’s Top Ten Reported Crimes
Offence Number
Theft Under $5,000 (non-motor vehicle) 504,557
Mischief 262,116
Administration of Justice Violations 216,836
Assault-level 1 163,034
Break and Enter 159,336
Fraud (excluding identity fraud) 112,863
Disturb the Peace 96,381
Theft of Motor Vehicle 85,020
Alcohol Impaired Driving 65,558
Uttering Threats 62,074
Homicide
There were 660 homicides reported, 48 more than 
the previous year. Ontario had the most homicides 
at 196, followed by Alberta (118), British Columbia 
(118) and Quebec (93). PEI reported no homicides 
while the Northwest Territories reported two (2) 
homicides followed by Newfoundland with four (4). 
As for provincial or territorial homicide rates, the 
Yukon had the highest rate (20.8 per 100,000 
population) followed by Nunavut (15.79), Northwest 
Territories (4.49), Manitoba (3.51), Saskatchewan 
(3.18) and Alberta (2.75). As for Census Metropolitan 
Areas (CMA’s), Thunder Bay, ON had the highest 
homicide rate at 5.80. The Canadian homicide rate 
was 1.68.
Canada
5,334
+1%
Top CMA Homicide Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Thunder Bay, ON 5.80 Kelowna, BC 2.99
Abbotsford-Mission, BC 4.72 Winnipeg, MB 2.96
Brantford, ON 3.36 Barrie, ON 2.25
Edmonton, AB 3.49 Calgary,  AB 2.07
Regina, SK 3.15 Vancouver, BC 2.02
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Robbery
In 2017 there were 22,739 robberies reported, 
resulting in a national rate of 62 robberies per 
100,000 population. Manitoba had the highest 
robbery rate followed by Saskatchewan and Alberta.
• Winnipeg, MB had the highest CMA
rate  for robbery in Canada (258),
+13% higher than its 2016 rate.
Sherbrooke, QC and Trois-Rivieres, QC both
had the lowest rate (20). However, Trois-Rivieres,
QC reported a jump of 54% in its robbery rate.
Guelph, ON (+34%), Saguenay, QC (+34%) and
Hamilton, ON (+27%) also saw high double digit
rate increases.
• Three CMAs reported declines in robberies of at
least 30% or more: Moncton, NB (-37%), Regina,
SK (-34%), and Abbotsford-Mission, BC (-30%).
Break and Enter
In 2017 there were 159,336 break-
ins reported to police. The national 
break-in rate was 434 break-ins per 
100,000 people. Nunavut had the 
highest break-in rate (1,534) followed by 
the Northwest Territories (1,027). 
Police-Reported Robberies
Province/ 
Territory
Rate Robberies Rate change 
2016 to 2017
MB 176 2,350 +12%
SK 87 1,014 -1%
AB 76 3,238 +3%
NWT 65 29 -6%
ON 65 9,238 +10%
BC 51 2,476 -18%
QC 43 3,642 -3%
NU 39 15 +47%
NF 35 185 -17%
NS 33 311 +14%
YK 31 12 -50%
NB 28 212 -8%
PEI 11 17 -7%
CANADA 62 22,739 +2%
Top Ten CMA Robbery Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Winnipeg, MB 258 Hamilton, ON 88
Saskatoon, SK 132 Regina, SK 83
Thunder Bay, ON 127 Calgary, AB 77
Edmonton, AB 104 Windsor, ON 76
Toronto, ON 89 Montreal, QC 70
Police-Reported Break-ins
Province/
Territory
Rate Break-ins Rate change 
2016 to 2017
NU 1,534 583 -13%
NWT 1,027 457 +1%
SK 839 9,768 -6%
MB 721 9,650 -1%
AB 717 30,746 +7%
BC 551 26,529 -12%
YK 489 188 -30%
NB 478 3,634 +11%
NF 404 2,137 -21%
QC 361 30,304 -4%
ON 297 42,218 +4%
NS 292 2,784 -5%
PEI 222 338 -13%
CANADA 434 159,336 -2%
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5,334
Canada’s
crime rate:
Number of Criminal Code
incidents (excluding traffic)
per 100,000 population
The Crime Severity Index (CSI)1 was 2% higher in 2017 than in 2016, marking the third consecutive increase 
after 11 years of declines. 
most notably, sexual assault (level 1), possession of stolen property, motor vehicle theft, and homicide. 
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In 2017, nine provinces and territories reported 
higher CSIs1  and four reported declines 
Top 5 increases
Greater Sudbury +25%
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Guelph +15%
Kitchener-Cambridge-
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St. Catharines-Niagara +12%
Top 5 decreases
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Police-reported 
Crime in Canada, 2017 POLICE
www.statcan.gc.ca
1. 
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Uniform Crime Reporting Survey.
“Police-reported crime statistics in Canada, 2017.” Juristat. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 85-002-X. Catalogue number: 11-627-MISBN: 978-0-660-27094-4
While the crime rate measures the volume of criminal violations, the Crime Severity Index (CSI) is a measure of both the volume and severity of police-reported crime. To determine the severity of 
a crime, all crimes are assigned a weight based on actual sentences handed down by the courts in all provinces and territories. More serious crimes are assigned higher weights, while less serious 
crimes are assigned lower weights. As a result, more serious offences have a greater impact on changes in the index. 
-15%
in 2017 
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January 25, 2019 
In Person or Webcast Click here.
February 8, 2019 
In Person or Webcast Click here.
March 4, 2019    Optional Workshop: Macrh 5, 2019
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
UPCOMING         
EXTERNAL LEARNING 
OPPORTUNITIES
  December 6, 2018 
  In Person  Click here.
April 26, 2019 
In Person or Webcast Click here.
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2018 BC LAW ENFORCEMENT 
MEMORIAL SERVICE
Parade participants to form up at 12:00 pm in the 
700 block of Wharf Street.
Parade will step off at 12:40 pm
OFFICERS BEING HONOURED
Constable John Davidson
Abbotsford Police Department
End of Watch: November 6, 2017
Constable Ian Jordan,
Victoria Police Department
End of Watch: April 11, 2018
click here for more info
Sunday, September 30, 2018 at 1:00 pm
BC Legislature, Victoria, BC
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“In Service: 10-8”
Sign-up Now
Are you interested in regularly receiving the In 
Service: 10-8 newsletter by email. You can sign 
up by clicking here and then clicking on the 
“Sign up” link:
This “Sign up” link will take you to the free 
Subscription Form that only requires an email. 
Volume 14 Issue 6 - November/December 2014
15-006
BACHELOR OF LAW ENFORCEMENT STUDIES
#"$)&-030'&.&3(&/$:4&$63*5:."/"(&.&/5
Expand your academic credentials and enhance your career options. 
Gain the theoretical background, applied skills and specialized 
knowledge for a career in public safety.
keeping communities safe
enforcing the law
on the front line
Apply today. JIBC.ca 604.528.5590    register@jibc.ca 
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
Be the one
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Upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills Courses
To register for any of the following courses, click on the course code below or contact the JIBC 
Registration Office at 604.528.5590 or 1.877.528.5591 (toll free). You can check Ways to Register for 
other registration methods and for assistance from the registration office. View the full 2018 Course 
Calendar online for a full list of upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills courses in 2018-19.
UPCOMING ONLINE COURSES 
October 11-November 14, 2018
Introduction to Administrative Law (INVE-1002)
November 8-December 13, 2018
Report Writing for Professional Investigators 
(INVE-1005)
November 19-December 21, 2018
Internet Open Source Investigations (INVE-1022)
UPCOMING COURSES IN NEW 
WESTMINSTER 
September 6-7, 2018
Introduction to the Criminal Justice System 
(INVE-1000)
September 18-20, 2018
Application for and Execution of Search Warrants 
(INVE-1006)
October 18, 2018
Testifying in Legal Proceedings/Hearings (INVE-1008)
UPCOMING COURSES IN VICTORIA
September 24-26, 2018
Report Writing for Investigators (INVE-1005)
October 1-5, 2018
Introduction to Investigative Skills & Processes 
(INVE-1003)
November 5-9, 2018
Enhanced Investigative Interviewing (INVE-1004)
Apply for the Investigation & 
Enforcement Skills Certificate
Complete the Investigation & Enforcement Skills 
Certificate, an academic credential that can help you 
pursue or advance your in the field of investigation, 
enforcement and public safety. Many people who 
have completed the requirements for the certificate 
have gone on to a variety of rewarding careers. Apply 
online today. For more information, visit the 
Investigation & Enforcement Skills Certificate 
webpage.
15-007
Online Graduate  
Certificate Programs
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 
TACTICAL CRIMINAL ANALYSIS
Expand your credentials and advance your career with 
these online graduate certificates. Learn through real world 
challenges, current cases, curriculum and techniques. 
Gain the specialized theoretical foundation and applied skills 
to function successfully as an analyst.
604.528.5843 JIBC.ca/graduatestudies
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
